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Abstract
Randomization of quantum states is the quantum analogue of the classical one-time pad. We present
an improved, efficient construction of an approximately randomizing map that uses O(d/ǫ2) Pauli op-
erators to map any d-dimensional state to a state that is within trace distance ǫ of the completely
mixed state. Our bound is a log d factor smaller than that of Hayden, Leung, Shor, and Winter [7], and
Ambainis and Smith [5].
Then, we show that a random sequence of essentially the same number of unitary operators, chosen
from an appropriate set, with high probability form an approximately randomizing map for d-dimensional
states. Finally, we discuss the optimality of these schemes via connections to different notions of pseu-
dorandomness, and give a new lower bound for small ǫ.
1 Introduction
1.1 Encryption of quantum states
Randomization of quantum states is a procedure analogous to encryption of classical messages such as in
the “one-time pad”. Imagine that two parties wish to exchange sensitive data in the form of quantum
states over an insecure quantum communication channel. They would like to encrypt the quantum data so
that any eavesdropper with access to the channel will not gain any information about the data. The idea
is to use a secret key, such as a uniformly random bit string, to transform a quantum state so that without
access to the key, an adversary is unable to distinguish two different encrypted states, when averaged over
the random choice of key. Equivalently, every state is mapped to the same mixed state by the encryption
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procedure. The encrypted state may then be sent over the insecure channel, and the receiver, who also
knows the key may decrypt to recover the message.
It has been known for several years that applying an independently chosen random Pauli operator to each
qubit of an n-qubit state maps it to the completely mixed state I/2n. This gives rise to a scheme for perfect
encryption of n-qubit quantum states with 2n secret uniformly random classical bits [6, 4]. This was also
shown to be optimal in terms of the number of bits of key required [6, 4, 8, 12].
The requirement of perfect encryption may be relaxed a little without compromising security, so that
the encrypted states are all close to being completely mixed, rather than being exactly so. By using
a probabilistic argument, Hayden, Leung, Shor, and Winter [7] showed that the number of bits of key
required then drops by a factor of approximately 2: to approximately randomize n-qubit states to within ǫ
of I/2n (in trace norm), we need at most n + log n + 2 log 1ǫ + O(1) bits of key. Subsequently, Ambainis
and Smith [5] gave an efficient (quadratic time) scheme for approximate state randomization with respect
to the trace norm using
n+min
{
2 log n+ 2 log
1
ǫ
, log n+ 3 log
1
ǫ
}
+O(1)
bits of key. Their construction is based on small-bias spaces (see, e.g., Ref. [11]). They also showed how
to reduce the key length to n+ 2 log 1ǫ at the cost of increasing the length of the ciphertext by 2n bits.
The amount of key required for approximate encryption with respect to the Hilbert-Schmidt norm and the
operator norm has been studied by Kerenidis and Nagaj [9]. They show that key length is quite sensitive
to the norm chosen to specify the security requirement.
In this article, we revisit approximate randomization with respect to the trace norm, which reflects most
closely our ability to physically distinguish quantum states. We first observe that an explicit scheme of
Ambainis and Smith may be improved by using an optimal construction of small-bias spaces due to Alon,
Goldreich, H˚astad, and Peralta [3]. This reduces the key size to n + 2 log 1ǫ + 4, and avoids the need for
ciphertext that is longer than the original message. This construction avoids another rather subtle issue.
The length-preserving schemes suggested in Ref. [5] require that the two communicating parties agree on a
prime number of length Θ(n). Since there is no known polynomial-time deterministic procedure to generate
a prime number of a specified length, additional communication is required to establish this shared prime
number. (The prime may be generated locally by one party by a randomized procedure.) The encryption
and decryption procedures we suggest require a common irreducible polynomial over GF(2) of degree Θ(n),
which may be computed independently by the two parties using an efficient deterministic algorithm due
to Shoup [15].
Next, we investigate collections of unitary operators that give rise to approximately randomizing maps.
We show by a probabilistic argument that any sequence of
O
(
d
ǫ2
log
1
ǫ
)
unitary operators chosen independently from a perfectly randomizing set with high probability defines an
approximately randomizing map for d-dimensional quantum states.
A simple rank argument shows that at least d(1− ǫ2 ) unitary operators are always needed, for approximate
encryption in d dimensions. No better lower bound is known. Methods for showing lower bounds for
perfect encryption all fail, since they crucially rely on the property of completely randomizing maps to
destroy all quantum correlation between the encrypted state and any state previously entangled to it.
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We take a different approach, and derive necessary conditions on distributions over Pauli operators that
correspond to approximately randomizing maps. These conditions are similar to notions such as “almost
n-wise independence” in the theory of pseudorandom distributions (see, e.g., Ref. [11]). As a corollary, we
get a tighter lower bound on randomizing sets of Pauli operators in the regime of exponentially small ǫ.
We describe our results more formally in the following two subsections, and then prove them in the
remaining sections.
1.2 Preliminaries
We refer the reader to the text [13] or the lecture notes [14] for definitions of basic concepts in quantum
information.
Let L(H) denote the space of linear operators on the Hilbert space H. This includes the cone of positive
semi-definite operators (density operators) on H. Let U(H) denote the set of unitary linear operators on
the Hilbert space H.
Definition 1.1 Let ǫ ≥ 0. A completely positive, trace-preserving (CPTP) linear operator R : L(Cd) →
L(Cd) is said to be ǫ-randomizing with respect to the norm ‖ · ‖ if, for all density operators (mixed states) ρ ∈
L(Cd), ∥∥∥∥R(ρ)− Id
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ǫ.
We say that R is completely randomizing if ǫ = 0.
Remark 1.1 Due to convexity, a map R that randomizes all pure states (rank 1 density operators) also
randomizes all mixed states to the same extent.
We will mainly discuss randomization with respect to the trace norm. For any linear operator M ∈ L(Cd),
the trace norm is defined by ‖M ‖tr = Tr
√
M †M . Equivalently, it is the sum of the singular values
of M , and therefore also referred to as the “1-norm”. The trace norm is arguably a more appropriate
measure of distinguishability in the context of eavesdropping, since it is directly related to information
that measurements reveal about quantum states. We will also use the Frobenius (or Hilbert-Schmidt)
norm in our proofs. This norm is defined as ‖M ‖F =
√
Tr(M †M). Since this is the ℓ2 norm of the vector
of singular values of M , this is also referred to as the “2-norm” by some authors.
Randomizing maps are easy to construct. For example, the map R : ρ 7→ Tr(ρ) Id is completely randomizing.
However, these maps are most useful when they can be inverted by a quantum operation to recover the
original state, as is required in the case of encryption.
The protocols for encryption we study involve two parties, labeled Alice and Bob, who share a secret,
uniformly random bit-string, called the private key k. Alice wishes to send a d-dimensional quantum
state ρ to Bob. She would like to apply an invertible quantum operation [12] to the state, and send it
to Bob so that when averaged over k, the map is randomizing. This would ensure that no eavesdropper
be able to distinguish two different messages with non-trivial probability. Such protocols have also been
called “private quantum channels” by some authors (see, e.g., Ref. [4]). We have implicitly assumed that
the quantum channel is noiseless unless an eavesdropper tampers with it. Therefore Bob, who also has the
key k, can apply the inverse operation to decrypt the message ρ perfectly.
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A natural way to create such an invertible randomizing operator is to select a sequence of unitary opera-
tors U1, . . . , Um and define
R(ρ) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
UiρU
†
i . (1)
Here, the index i corresponds to the shared secret key held by the communicating parties, and is unknown
to any eavesdropper. With a suitable choice of unitary operators the map R would be ǫ-randomizing.
In fact, any orthogonal set of unitary operations on Cd, such as the set of d2 Pauli operators, form a
completely randomizing map [6].
The most general one-way encryption scheme may in addition involve an ancilla that depends upon the
key [12]:
R(ρ) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Ui(ρ⊗ σi)U †i .
This is slightly more general than the form claimed in Ref. [4]. However, the results in the latter article
extend to the more general maps above (see also Ref. [8]). This general form of encryption uses more qubits
in the ciphertext than originally present in the message, which is undesirable from an efficiency point of
view. We will only study randomizing maps as in equation (1), which correspond to encryption without
ancilla.
The randomizing maps we construct will involve the Pauli operators. We will denote the Pauli operators
on a single qubit by I,X,Y,Z:
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, Y = iXZ =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
.
These operators are unitary, Hermitian, and they square to the identity. The non-identity Pauli matrices
anti-commute with other non-identity Pauli matrices. For example, XY = −YX. Where the overall phase
of ‘i’ is irrelevant, we will substitute Y with the matrix XZ.
For two n-bit strings a, b, let |a ∧ b| = ∑nj=1 ajbj. We will often represent a tensor product of n single
qubit Pauli operators by a string of 2n bits (a, b) ∈ {0, 1}2n using the correspondence
(a, b) ↔ i|a∧b|XaZb, where (2)
Xa = Xa1 ⊗Xa2 ⊗ · · · ⊗Xan ,
and Zb is defined similarly. Let Pn denote the set
{
i|a∧b|XaZb : (a, b) ∈ {0, 1}2n
}
of all tensor products of n
single qubit Pauli operators.
For two n-bit strings a, b ∈ {0, 1}n, considered as elements of GF(2)n, the standard scalar product is defined
as 〈u, x〉 = ∑i uixi (mod 2). The symplectic inner product of a pair of 2n-bit strings (a, b) and (c, d),
considered as elements of GF(2)2n, is given by 〈a, d〉 + 〈b, c〉 (mod 2). The symplectic inner product tells
us when two Pauli operators commute: XaZb commutes with XcZd if and only if the symplectic inner
product of (a, b) and (c, d) is 0.
A distribution p over {0, 1}2n defines a CPTP map on n qubits via the above bijection:
Rp(ρ) =
∑
(a,b)∈{0,1}2n
p(a, b) XaZbρZbXa. (3)
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We will study randomizing maps of this form more closely. A special case is when p is uniformly distributed
over a set S ⊂ {0, 1}2n. In this case, we will denote the associated CPTP map by RS .
The single qubit Pauli operators P1 form an orthogonal basis for L(C
2) under the inner product (A,B) =
Tr(B†A). The set Pn of 2
2n tensor products of n such Pauli operators similarly form an orthogonal basis
for L(C2
n
). There are also bases of d2 orthogonal unitary operators on L(Cd) for general dimension d (that
is not a power of 2).
We will also make use of the concept of a stabilizer state [13, Section 10.5.1, page 454]. A stabilizer
group G is an abelian group generated by a subset T ⊂ Pn of the Pauli operators on n qubits. Each
stabilizer group G defines a linear subspace CG of C
2n which is the common +1-eigenspace of all the Pauli
operators in G. If G is generated by k independent Pauli operators, and does not contain −I, then the
linear subspace CG has dimension 2
n−k. By a stabilizer state, we will mean a pure state which spans the
one dimensional subspace CG stabilized by a group G of order 2
n.
Every stabilizer group generated by k independent Pauli matrices may be specified by listing its generators
row-wise in a k×2n boolean matrix M via the bijection in equation (2). Since the generators all commute,
different rows of the matrix have symplectic inner product 0 with each other. For a 2n-bit vector w = (u, v),
letM ·w denote the k-bit vector obtained by taking the symplectic inner product of the k rows ofM with w.
1.3 Statement of Results
The problem we address in this paper is the construction of approximately randomizing maps which
preserve the number of qubits in the message.
First, in Section 2, we describe an an explicit construction for a sequence of unitaries that approximately
randomize. This construction combines the work of Refs. [5, 3, 15] to give an improvement over the explicit
construction by Ambainis and Smith [5].
Theorem 1.2 For any ǫ ∈ (0, 2], and dimension d = 2n, there is a sequence of m = 16d
ǫ2
unitary opera-
tions {Ui : 1 ≤ i ≤ m}, each a tensor product of Pauli operators, such that the map
R(ρ) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
UiρU
†
i
is ǫ-randomizing with respect to the trace norm. The sequence of Pauli operators defining Ui may be
determined from the index i in time O˜((logm)4) = O˜(n4).
Remark 1.3 The notation O˜(T ) above suppresses factors poly-logarithmic in T . Since there is an linear-
time completely randomizing map consisting of a sequence of d2 unitary operators, the above theorem is
only useful when ǫ > 4/
√
d = 4/2n/2. We were therefore able to assume that logm = log d+2 log 1ǫ+O(1) =
O(n).
Next, we study which sequences of unitary operations are suitable for approximate encryption. In Section 3,
we prove that almost all sequences of O( d
ǫ2
ln 1ǫ ) unitary operations form an ǫ approximately randomizing
map for d dimensional states.
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Theorem 1.4 For all ǫ ∈ (0, 2], a random sequence of m = 37dǫ2 ln
(
15
ǫ
)
unitary operations {Ui : 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
in U(Cd) defines a map
R(ρ) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
UiρU
†
i
and R is ǫ-randomizing with respect to the trace norm, with probability at least 1 − e−d/2. Each unitary
operation Ui may be chosen independently from an arbitrary distribution over U(C
d) that gives rise to a
completely randomizing map.
In the above theorem, each unitary in the sequence may be chosen independently according to an arbitrary
completely randomizing distribution of unitaries, not necessarily the same for each i. For instance, it may
be chosen according to the Haar measure on U(Cd), or the uniform distribution over any orthogonal unitary
basis for U(Cd). For the case that ρ is an n-qubit state, the unitary operators can be chosen from among
the Pauli operators, which are particularly simple operators.
Theorem 1.4 is in general incomparable to Theorem II.2 of Hayden et al . [7]. Our theorem reduces by a
factor of log d the number of unitaries required for approximate encryption in the trace norm. However, it
does not imply the stronger bound of ǫ/d with respect to the spectral norm (“∞-norm”) on the distance
from the completely mixed state, even with a log d factor more unitaries.
We conjecture that the construction of the approximately randomizing map in Theorem 1.2 is optimal in
the use of secret key bits, up to an additive constant. We are unable to establish this rigorously at present,
but take some steps towards this.
We derive conditions on distributions over {0, 1}2n that define randomizing maps. These conditions are
similar in flavour to other notions of pseudo-randomness such as “almost k-wise independence”. We believe
these will help prove the optimality of our constructions.
Theorem 1.5 Let Rp be a CPTP map on n qubits induced by a distribution p over {0, 1}2n, as in equa-
tion (3). Let V be the random variable corresponding to p. If Rp is an ǫ-randomizing map with respect to
the trace norm, then the random variable M · V is ǫ-close to the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n in ℓ1
distance for every n× 2n matrix M over GF(2) that defines a stabilizer state.
As a corollary, we prove that any distribution corresponding to an ǫ randomizing map (with respect to the
trace norm) is necessarily ǫ-biased (cf. Definition 2.1 in Section 2). This implies a new lower bound on the
number of bits of key in the regime of extremely small ǫ, when it is smaller than 2−n/2.
Corollary 1.6 Let Rp be a CPTP map on n qubits induced by a distribution p over {0, 1}2n, as in equa-
tion (3). If Rp is an ǫ-randomizing map with respect to the trace norm, then the distribution p is ǫ-biased.
Therefore, if p has support S ⊂ {0, 1}2n, then |S| is at least a universal constant times
min
{
22n,
n
ǫ2 log 1ǫ
}
.
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2 An explicit randomizing set
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.2. We describe an explicit sequence of unitary (Pauli) operators that
are approximately randomizing. The i-th unitary in the sequence can be determined from the index i in
polynomial time. To obtain this result, we use the connection made by Ambainis and Smith [5] between
randomizing maps and small-bias spaces, together with a more efficient construction of such spaces due to
Alon, Goldreich, H˚astad, and Peralta [3].
Recall that the Pauli operators form an orthogonal basis for matrices, so we may express any density
matrix over n qubits as
ρ =
∑
M∈Pn
Tr(M †ρ)
Tr(M †M)
M
=
1
2n
∑
M∈Pn
αM M,
where α = (αM ) is a vector in C
2n with ‖α ‖22 ≤ 2n. The component αI/2n of any quantum state along
the identity operator is exactly 1/d = 1/2n. If a CPTP map E is completely randomizing, then
E(ρ) =
1
2n
∑
M∈Pn
αM E(M)
=
1
2n
I.
Thus, the map annihilates all the non-identity components of the state. The idea behind the construction
for approximate randomization is to construct a map that shrinks the non-identity components of a density
matrix sufficiently, so that it becomes close to completely mixed. Such a map may be constructed from
small-bias sets.
Definition 2.1 (Naor and Naor [11]) The bias of a subset S ⊂ {0, 1}k with respect to a string u ∈
{0, 1}k is defined as
bias(S, u) =
∣∣∣Ex∈S (−1)〈u,x〉∣∣∣
= |1− 2 Ex∈S 〈u, x〉| ,
where the expectation is taken over strings x chosen uniformly at random from S, and 〈u, x〉 = ∑i uixi
(mod 2) is the standard scalar product over GF(2).
The subset S ⊂ {0, 1}k is said to be δ-biased if the bias with respect to every non-zero string is bounded
by δ: bias(S, u) ≤ δ for all u ∈ {0, 1}k − {0k}.
This definition extends to arbitrary distributions p over {0, 1}k in the natural way: bias(p, u) = ∣∣E (−1)〈u,X〉∣∣,
where the random variable X is distributed according to p, and p is said to be δ-biased if its bias with respect
to every non-zero string u is bounded by δ.
The bias with respect to a string u is the bias of the XOR (exclusive OR) of the bits selected by the
string u, i.e., the difference of the probabilities that this XOR is 0 or 1. The set of all strings has bias zero,
and small-bias spaces are more efficient substitutes for this set.
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Recall from equation (3) in Section 1.2 that a subset of strings S ⊂ {0, 1}2n defines a CPTP map on n
qubits as follows:
RS(ρ) =
1
|S|
∑
(a,b)∈S
XaZbρZbXa. (4)
If we choose S = {0, 1}2n, we get a completely randomizing map. Ambainis and Smith showed that if we
choose S to be a δ-biased set, then the operator RS scales every non-identity Pauli operator by a factor at
most δ. We then get an ǫ-randomizing map by setting δ to be suitably small, namely, ǫ · 2−n/2.
Proposition 2.1 (Ambainis and Smith [5]) Let S ⊂ {0, 1}2n be a set with bias at most ǫ/2n/2. Then
the map RS as defined in equation (4) is an ǫ-randomizing map with respect to the trace norm for n-qubit
states.
For completeness, we give a proof of this proposition in Appendix A.
We now use an optimal construction of δ-biased sets to get our randomizing map.
Proposition 2.2 (Alon, Goldreich, H˚astad, Peralta [3]) Let r, s be positive integers. There is a sub-
set S ⊂ {0, 1}rs, of size 22r, with bias at most s2r . Given a monic irreducible polynomial of degree r
over GF(2), and an index 1 ≤ i ≤ rs, the i-th string in S may be constructed with O(rs) multiplications
in GF(2r), and a further r2s bit operations.
We describe this construction in Appendix B.
For our purposes, we need r, s such that the length of the strings is 2n, and the bias of the set S is at
most ǫ · 2−n/2. In other words,
rs = 2n,
s
2r
≤ ǫ · 2−n/2.
Solving for the smallest such r, we get that the length of key 2r is at most
2r ≤
⌈
n+ 2 log
1
ǫ
+ 4
⌉
.
So a δ-biased set of size m = 22r ≤ 16 · 2n/ǫ2 with δ ≤ ǫ · 2−n/2 exists. This gives us an ǫ-randomizing
map RS with m unitary operations, corresponding to a key length of 2r, as above.
Since a completely randomizing map exists with 22n unitaries, we may assume that ǫ ≥ 2−n/2 in our
construction. In other words, we may assume that r ≤ n.
Given a key of length 2r, and an irreducible polynomial of degree r over GF(2), the associated tensor
product of single qubit Pauli operators may be computed with O(rs) = O(n) multiplications in GF(2r), and
a further O(r2s) = O(n2) bit operations. Multiplication in GF(2r) can be implemented with O(r log r) =
O(n log n) bit operations (see, e.g., Theorem 8.7 and its corollary on page 288, Chapter 8, in Ref. [1]). The
bit-complexity of these computations is therefore O(n2 log n). Furthermore, a monic irreducible polynomial
of degree r over GF(2) may be computed by a deterministic algorithm that takes O˜(r4) bit operations [15,
page 40, Theorem 3.6]. Thus, this part of the construction dominates the time complexity, which is in
effect O˜(n4). These observations conclude the proof of Theorem 1.2.
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3 The abundance of randomizing maps
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.4, which states that there is a plethora of randomizing maps that use
essentially the same number of bits of key as in the explicit construction. We use a probabilistic argument
that is similar in structure to that of Hayden et al . [7]. To show that m unitaries suffice, we first show that
a sequence of m random unitary operations approximately randomize any fixed state with high probability.
To extend the approximate randomizing property to all states, we show that it suffices to randomize a
set of finitely many pure states that in a certain precise sense approximately cover the unit sphere in Cd.
Finally, a “union bound” shows that with probability exponentially close to 1 every state is approximately
randomized.
In our argument, each unitary operator is independently distributed according to the Haar measure, or any
other distribution over unitary operations corresponding to a completely randomizing map. In particular,
the operators could be chosen uniformly at random from an orthogonal basis for L(C2
n
), such as the Pauli
basis Pn.
Proof: (of Theorem 1.4) Consider a sequence of m unitaries {Ui} independently chosen from a measure µi
on U(Cd). We require that the measure µi give us a completely randomizing map. For any density
matrix ρ ∈ L(Cd), and U distributed according to µi,
EU UρU
† =
∫
UρU † dµi =
I
d
. (5)
The sequence {Ui} define the map
R(ρ) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
UiρU
†
i .
Fix a pure state ρ ∈ L(Cd). We first bound the expected distance of R(ρ) from the completely mixed
state I/d. Define the random variable Yρ as follows
Yρ =
∥∥∥∥R(ρ)− Id
∥∥∥∥
tr
.
While we may carry out a similar analysis for a mixed state ρ, it is sufficient (and also simpler) to restrict
ourselves to pure states; cf. Remark 1.1.
Proposition 3.1 EYρ ≤
√
d/m.
Proof: From Corollary A.2, we have
Y 2ρ ≤ d ‖R(ρ) ‖2F − 1. (6)
By the definition of Frobenius norm,
‖R(ρ) ‖2F = Tr R(ρ)2
=
1
m2
∑
i
Tr
(
UiρU
†
i
)2
+
1
m2
∑
i 6=j
Tr
(
UiρU
†
i UjρU
†
j
)
=
1
m
+
1
m2
∑
i 6=j
Tr
(
UiρU
†
i UjρU
†
j
)
. (7)
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Here, we have used the linearity of the trace function, and the fact that Tr(σ2) = 1 for any pure state
density matrix σ.
Recall that the unitary operators Ui are chosen randomly according to a measure µi satisfying equation (5).
Taking expectation over the random choice of unitaries, we get
E{Ui}[TrR(ρ)
2] =
1
m
+
1
m2
∑
i 6=j
E{Ui}Tr
(
UiρU
†
i UjρU
†
j
)
=
1
m
+Tr
[
(EUiUiρU
†
i )(EUjUjρU
†
j )
]
(8)
=
1
m
+Tr
I
d2
=
1
m
+
1
d
. (9)
In equation (8), we used the fact that Ui and Uj are chosen independently according to measures µi, µj.
Putting equations (6) and (9) together gives us
EYρ ≤
√
EY 2ρ
≤
√
d ‖R(ρ) ‖2F − 1
=
√
d/m.
the claimed bound on E Yρ.
Thus, the random sequence of unitary operators {Ui} randomizes any fixed state ρ very well in expectation,
provided m is chosen suitably larger than d.
We now note that the function fρ(U1, U2, . . . , Um) defining the random variable Yρ has bounded difference.
In other words, if we replace any one of the unitaries Ui by another unitary U˜i, the function value changes
by a small amount. Denote the randomizing map given by the modified sequence
(U1, U2, . . . , Ui−1, U˜i, Ui+1, . . . , Um)
by R˜. Then, we have∣∣∣fρ(U1, U2, . . . , U˜i, . . . , Um)− fρ(U1, U2, . . . , Um)∣∣∣ (10)
=
∣∣∣∣
∥∥∥∥R(ρ)− Id
∥∥∥∥
tr
−
∥∥∥∥ R˜(ρ)− Id
∥∥∥∥
tr
∣∣∣∣
≤
∥∥∥R(ρ)− R˜(ρ)∥∥∥
tr
, By the triangle inequality
=
1
m
∥∥∥UiρU †i − U˜iρU˜ †i ∥∥∥
tr
≤ 2
m
. (11)
The McDiarmid bound from probability theory states that any random variable with such a bounded
difference property is concentrated around its mean.
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Theorem 3.2 (McDiarmid’s Inequality [10]) Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xm bem independent random variables,
with Xk taking values in a set Ak for each k. Suppose that the measurable function f :
∏m
i=1Ai → R satisfies∣∣f(x)− f(x′)∣∣ ≤ ck
whenever the vectors x and x′ differ only in the k-th coordinate. Let Y = f(X1,X2, . . . ,Xm) be the
corresponding random variable. Then for any t ≥ 0,
Pr [Y − E(Y ) ≥ t] ≤ exp
( −2t2∑m
i=1 c
2
k
)
Theorem 3.2, along with equation (11) immediately implies that for any fixed pure state ρ ∈ Cd,
Pr[Yρ − EYρ ≥ δ] ≤ exp
(−δ2m
2
)
.
This implies, using our bound from Proposition (3.1) on the expected value of Yρ,
Pr[Yρ ≥ δ +
√
d/m] ≤ exp
(−δ2m
2
)
. (12)
The probability that R(ρ) deviates from the completely mixed state decays exponentially in its distance,
and the number of unitary operators m. We would like to extend this property to all pure states. For
this, it suffices to randomize a suitably large, but finite, set of pure states (a “net”) given by the following
proposition (see, e.g. Ref. [7] for a proof).
Proposition 3.3 For every 0 < η < 1, there is a set M of pure states in Cd with |M| ≤ (5/η)2d, such
that for every pure state |φ〉 ∈ Cd, there is a state |φ˜〉 ∈ M with
∥∥∥ |φ〉〈φ| − |φ˜〉〈φ˜|∥∥∥
tr
≤ η.
From Proposition 3.3, we know that every pure state ρ ∈ Cd is η-close in trace norm to a pure state ρ˜
from a finite set M of size |M| ≤
(
5
η
)2d
. By the triangle inequality, and the unitary equivalence of the
trace norm, it is straightforward to show that |Yρ − Yρ˜| ≤ η. Therefore, if Yρ ≥ ǫ, then Yρ˜ ≥ ǫ − η for
some ρ˜ ∈ M.
We can now bound the probability that the map R fails to randomize some pure state.
Pr [∃ρ : Yρ > ǫ]
≤ Pr [∃ρ˜ ∈ M : Yρ˜ > ǫ− η] From the discussion above
≤ |M| · Pr [Yρ˜ > ǫ− η] By the union bound, for the worst case state ρ˜
≤
(
5
η
)2d
exp
(−m
2
(ǫ− η −
√
d/m )2
)
By equation (12)
≤ e−d/2,
if η is chosen to be at most ǫ/3, and m at least
37d
ǫ2
ln
(
15
ǫ
)
.
Thus, there is an overwhelming majority of m = O( d
ǫ2
log 1ǫ ) unitaries such that the corresponding map is
randomizing to within ǫ, with respect to the trace norm.
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4 Towards proving optimality
The best known lower bound for an ǫ-randomizing map R with respect to the trace norm, defined by a
distribution over unitary maps on n qubits, is n+ log(1− ǫ2). This follows directly from a rank argument:
consider the image of a pure state. It has rank at most m, the number of unitary matrices defining R.
The distance of any rank m density matrix from the completely mixed state I/2n is at least 2(1−m · 2−n).
Since R is ǫ-randomizing, this distance is at most ǫ, and the bound on the number of bits of key, which
is logm, follows.
The above lower bound does not reflect the amount of key required to achieve better security, as ǫ → 0.
(At ǫ = 0, the optimal number of key bits is 2n.) To get stronger bounds, we focus on the simplest and
perhaps most natural maps, those defined by distributions of Pauli operators, as in equation (3).
Recall that the n-qubit Pauli operators are in one-to-one correspondence with the set {0, 1}2n, and we
may therefore study distributions on this set instead. We derive conditions on these distributions (stated
in Theorem 1.5) which we believe will help prove the optimality of our constructions. As a corollary, we
prove that any distribution corresponding to an ǫ randomizing map (with respect to the trace norm) is
necessarily ǫ-biased (cf. Definition 2.1). This implies a new lower bound on the number of bits of key. The
bound makes the strong dependence of key length on the parameter ǫ explicit, while sacrificing the strong
dependence on message length n.
In Theorem 1.5, we stated constraints on distributions over Pauli matrices that are randomizing. We prove
these constraints here by considering the action of randomizing maps on stabilizer states.
Proof: (of Theorem 1.5) Let |ψ〉 be an n-qubit (pure) stabilizer state, stabilized by a group whose n
generators are given by the set T . We claim that for any Pauli operator P , the state P |ψ〉 is either parallel
to |ψ〉 or orthogonal to it.
If P commutes with every Pauli operator in T , then P |ψ〉 is also stabilized by T : For g ∈ T , we have gP |ψ〉 =
Pg|ψ〉 = P |ψ〉. Since the linear subspace stabilized by T is one-dimensional, P |ψ〉 belongs the linear span
of |ψ〉. If P anticommutes with some g ∈ T , then 〈ψ|P |ψ〉 = 〈ψ|Pg|ψ〉 = −〈ψ|gP |ψ〉 = −〈ψ|P |ψ〉 = 0.
It follows that for any two Pauli operators P,Q, the states P |ψ〉 and Q|ψ〉 are either parallel or orthogonal—
we use the matrix PQ = P †Q in the above argument. In fact, we can say something stronger. Let M
be the n × 2n matrix representation of the generator set T . The states P |ψ〉 and Q|ψ〉 are parallel iff
M ·w =M ·w′, where w and w′ are the 2n-bit representations of the Pauli operators P and Q, respectively,
and M · z is the vector of symplectic inner products of the rows of M with z. This is because
M · w =M · w′ iff M · (w +w′) = 0,
which is equivalent to saying that PQ commutes with the stabilizer.
Let |ψx〉 be a canonical pure state in the linear span of P |ψ〉, where P is any Pauli matrix such thatM ·w =
x, and w ∈ {0, 1}2n represents P . Since the n generators in T are independent, the matrix M has rank n.
Therefore, the image of set {0, 1}2n under M is all of {0, 1}n, the states |ψx〉 are well-defined as x ranges
in {0, 1}n, and they form an orthonormal basis for C2n .
Now consider a randomizing map Rp specified by a distribution p over {0, 1}2n, and its action on the
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stabilizer state |ψ〉. We use ψ,ψx, etc. as shorthand for the density matrices |ψ〉〈ψ|, |ψx〉〈ψx|, etc.
Rp(ψ) =
∑
(a,b)∈{0,1}2n
p(a, b) XaZbψZbXa
=
∑
(a,b)
p(a, b) ψM ·(a,b).
This mixed state is diagonal in the basis {|ψx〉}, and therefore its trace distance from the completely mixed
state is ∥∥∥∥Rp(ψ) − I2n
∥∥∥∥
tr
=
∑
x∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣∣Pr[M · V = x]− 12n
∣∣∣∣ ,
where V is the random variable corresponding to the distribution p. Since Rp is ǫ-randomizing, the above
expression is bounded by ǫ. This is precisely the ℓ1 distance of the random variable M · V from uniform
on n-bits.
These conditions imposed by on distributions over Pauli matrices are similar to conditions such as “almost
k-wise independence” (see, e.g., Ref. [11]), but are not equivalent to any of the standard notions of pseudo-
randomness. As claimed in Corollary 1.6, it is however a stronger notion than that of having bias at most ǫ.
We finish with a proof of this corollary, which also gives us a stronger lower bound for the key size for
exponentially small ǫ.
Proof: (of Corollary 1.6) Consider any non-zero string w ∈ {0, 1}2n. Let w = (u, v), where u, v ∈ {0, 1}n.
We would like to show that the random bit 〈w, V 〉 has bias at most ǫ, where V is the random variable
corresponding to the distribution p.
We first prove this property for w such that for each i = 1, . . . , n, at least one of ui, vi is 1. Consider n
stabilizer generators, the i-th one gi defined as gi =
⊗n
j=1 Pj , where Pj = I for all j 6= i, and Pi is equal to
Z if ui = 1 6= vi,
X if vi = 1 6= ui, and
Y if ui = 1 = vi.
These n generators {gi} commute and are independent, and therefore specify a pure stabilizer state. This
state is a tensor product of n single qubit Pauli eigenvectors,
|0〉, 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), or 1√
2
(|0〉 + i|1〉),
depending upon whether the i-th generator gi has Z,X, or Y, respectively, in its i-th tensor factor.
For i = 1, . . . , n, let ei be the n-bit string which is zero in all positions except the i-th. Then the 2n-bit
string representing the generator gi is
gi ↔ (〈ei, v〉 ei, 〈ei, u〉 ei).
Consider the action of the map Rp on this stabilizer state. From Theorem 1.5, we get that the random
variable M · V is ǫ close to uniform on n-bits, where M is the matrix representing the stabilizer {gi}. Its
rows are given by the equation (13). Note thatM ·V is the sequence of n bits uiVi+viVn+i (mod 2). Any
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distribution that is ǫ close to uniform in ℓ1-norm is also ǫ-biased. Therefore, the XOR of the bits in M · V
has bias at most ǫ. The XOR is precisely the scalar product 〈(u, v), V 〉 = 〈w, V 〉, so we have proven the
first part of the claim for strings w of the type described above.
For an arbitrary non-zero string w = (u, v), we consider a string w′ = (u′, v) such that u′i = 1 for all i such
that ui = vi = 0, and u
′
i = ui for the remaining i. From the argument above, we have that M
′ · V is close
to uniform, where M ′ is defined by the string w′. The scalar product 〈w, V 〉 is the XOR of a subset of the
bits in M ′ · V . Therefore its bias is also at most ǫ.
When p is uniform over a subset S ⊂ {0, 1}2n, we get that the set is ǫ-biased, and the stated lower bound
on its size is given in Ref. [3, equation (3), page 13]. The same lower bound holds for possibly non-uniform
distributions p with support on the subset S [2].
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A Proofs of some claims
In this section of the Appendix, we present proofs of some statements made in the article.
We use the following relation between trace norm and Frobenius norm, which is essentially an application
of the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality.
Proposition A.1 For any rank d matrix M , ‖M ‖tr ≤
√
d · ‖M ‖F .
We use this relation in the following form.
Corollary A.2 Let M ∈ L(Cd) be a density matrix. Then, its trace distance from the completely mixed
state I/d is bounded as ∥∥∥∥M − Id
∥∥∥∥
2
tr
≤ d ‖M ‖2F − 1.
Proof: By the definition of Frobenius norm in terms of the trace inner product,∥∥∥∥M − Id
∥∥∥∥
2
F
= ‖M ‖2F − 2 Tr
M
d
+
∥∥∥∥ Id
∥∥∥∥
2
F
= ‖M ‖2F −
2
d
TrM +Tr
I
d2
= ‖M ‖2F −
1
d
.
The corollary now follows from Proposition A.1.
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We can now prove Proposition 2.1.
Proof: (of Proposition 2.1) First, we express a state ρ in the Pauli basis:
ρ =
1
2n
∑
(u,v)∈{0,1}2n
αuv X
uZv,
where α = (αuv) ∈ C22n with ‖α ‖22 ≤ 2n.
Since X and Z anti-commute,
RS(X
uZv) =
1
|S|
∑
(a,b)∈S
XaZb (XuZv) ZbXa
=
1
|S|
∑
(a,b)∈S
(−1)〈u,b〉+〈v,a〉 XuZv
= δv,uX
uZv,
where 〈x, y〉 is the standard scalar product of two strings over GF(2), and δv,u ∈ R is given by the equation
above. Note that |δv,u| = bias(S, (v, u)). Thus, if S is δ-biased, then each non-identity component of any
density matrix will be scaled by a factor of δ:
RS(ρ) =
1
2n
∑
(u,v)∈{0,1}2n
αuv RS(X
uZv)
=
1
2n
∑
(u,v)
αuv δv,uX
uZv,
where |δv,u| = bias(S, (v, u)) ≤ δ = ǫ/2n/2, for all (v, u) 6= 02n. The Frobenius norm of the randomized
state is thus concentrated in the first term, the completely mixed state.
‖RS(ρ) ‖2F =
1
22n
∑
(u,v)
|αuv|2 · δ2v,u · ‖XuZv ‖2F
≤ 1
22n

2n + ∑
(u,v)6=02n
|αuv|2 · δ2 · 2n


≤ 1
2n
(1 + ǫ2).
Here, we used the bound of 2n on ‖α ‖22.
From Corollary A.2,
‖RS(ρ) ‖2tr ≤ 2n ‖RS(ρ) ‖2F − 1
≤ ǫ2,
and Proposition 2.1 now follows.
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B A construction of small bias sets
In this section, we present the construction described in Proposition 2.2 of small-bias spaces due to Alon,
Goldreich, H˚astad, and Peralta [3, Section 5] (see the remarks at the end of the Section 5 in the reference).
This construction is optimal in the regime of extremely small biases that we are interested in.
Let r, s be positive integers. We would like to identify a set S ⊂ {0, 1}rs of size 22r and with bias
at most s2−r. We construct S by describing a string sxy for each pair of string x, y ∈ {0, 1}r. We
identify both x and y with elements of the vector space GF(2r) over the field GF(2) in the natural way.
Let {ei}, i ∈ [r] = {0, 1, . . . , r − 1} be a basis for the vector space GF(2r).
We define the string sxy bit-by-bit. For i ∈ [r], j ∈ [s], the (i, j)-th bit of sxy is given by
〈
eix
j , y
〉
. All
multiplications in the expression eix
j are in the field GF (2r), and 〈·, ·〉 is the standard scalar product
in GF(2). The string sxy is thus given by the following array of bits:
〈e0, y〉 〈e0x, y〉 · · ·
〈
e0x
s−1, y
〉
〈e1, y〉 〈e1x, y〉 · · ·
〈
e1x
s−1, y
〉
...
〈er−1, y〉 〈er−1x, y〉 · · ·
〈
er−1x
s−1, y
〉
Note that computing all the rs bits of sxy takes O(rs) multiplications in GF(2
r), and a further O(r2s) bit
operations to compute scalar products.
It only remains to argue that the bias of the set S = {sxy} so constructed has bias at most s2−r.
Proposition B.1 The set S = {sxy} ⊂ {0, 1}rs constructed as above has bias at most s−12r .
Proof: Let u ∈ {0, 1}rs be any non-zero string. For any string sxy ∈ S, we have
〈u, sxy〉 =
∑
i∈[r],j∈[s]
uij
〈
eix
j , y
〉
=
〈∑
ij
uij eix
j, y
〉
= 〈pu(x), y〉,
where
pu(x) =
∑
j∈[s]

∑
i∈[r]
uijei

 xj
is a polynomial in x with coefficients in GF(2r) and with degree at most s−1. Since u is non-zero, and {ei}
are linearly independent, the polynomial pu is not identically 0.
The bias of S with respect to u is then given by
bias(S, u) = |1− 2Exy〈u, sxy〉|
=
∣∣∣∣1− 2 Prxy [〈u, sxy〉 = 1]
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣1− 2 Prxy [〈pu(x), y〉 = 1]
∣∣∣∣ .
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We may estimate the above probability as
Pr
xy
[〈pu(x), y〉 = 1] = Pr
xy
[〈pu(x), y〉 = 1 | pu(x) 6= 0] · Pr
x
[pu(x) 6= 0]
=
1
2
Pr
x
[pu(x) 6= 0],
since the scalar product of any non-zero pu(x) with a uniformly random y has zero bias. Putting these
together, we have
bias(S, u) = 1− Pr
x
[pu(x) 6= 0]
= Pr
x
[pu(x) = 0]
≤ s− 1
2r
,
since any non-zero polynomial of degree s− 1 has at most s− 1 roots in any field.
This finishes the description of the small bias set in Proposition 2.2.
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